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Coercion by the Numbers: 
Conditional Spending Doctrine 
and the Future of Federal 
Education Spending 
Abstract 
In NFIB v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court for the first time deemed 
a federal spending program unconstitutionally coercive. This decision 
transformed the coercion principle from a mere rhetorical device into 
a legitimate restraint on federal conditional spending. Specifically, the 
coercion principle addresses the risk that Congress will use its 
spending power to subvert state regulation in areas in which states 
have a reserved right to regulate. As this principle has developed over 
recent decades, federal spending for elementary and secondary 
education has steadily increased. 
This Note applies the Court’s reasoning from NFIB to No Child 
Left Behind, which remains the primary piece of federal education 
legislation, and concludes that a strong case exists for finding federal 
education spending unconstitutionally coercive. Such a case resonates 
with the rationales underlying the coercion principle. Long-term 
trends in education spending are then considered to show that 
coercion will likely become a genuine issue in the near future, even as 
Congress enacts new education legislation. Finally, this Note discusses 
federal involvement in education and makes two legislative 
recommendations for absolving coercion issues. 
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Introduction 
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius1  
(NFIB), often dubbed the “health care decision,” the Supreme Court 
took an unprecedented step in striking down an exercise of 
congressional conditional spending as unconstitutionally coercive.2 
However, the long-term ramifications of this holding remain unsettled. 
While pushing the conditional spending doctrine forward, the Court’s 
three opinions leave many questions unanswered. How exactly does 
the Court judge coercion? At what point does “pressure turn[ ] into 
compulsion?”3 Are other conditional spending programs vulnerable? 
This Note addresses those questions. More specifically, it 
examines how conditional spending for education may likewise be 
 
1. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
2. Id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
3. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937). 
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deemed unconstitutionally coercive under the Supreme Court’s new 
conditional spending jurisprudence. Part I reviews the relevant history 
of the conditional spending doctrine, finishing with the Medicaid 
portion of the recent health care decision. Part II outlines the 
evolution of the federal government’s involvement in education and 
the spending schemes associated with that involvement. Part III 
briefly reviews the federal courts’ application of the conditional 
spending doctrine to federal education spending. Part IV employs the 
analysis from the health care decision to conclude that modern 
congressional conditional spending for education violates the coercion 
principle. Part V concludes this Note by observing the problems 
associated with federal involvement in education and offers 
recommendations for reconciling federal education spending with the 
coercion principle.  
I. Conditional Spending Doctrine 
Congress regularly makes federal funds available to states and 
localities provided that the recipients comply with certain conditions. 
An instrument of cooperative federalism, conditional funding benefits 
state and federal officials alike. State representatives avoid the 
perception that their sovereignty has been undermined by national 
programs, while setting in motion initiatives that presumably benefit 
their citizens.4 Congress benefits in terms of efficiency and increased 
popular acceptance of its policies by those opposed to a wide-reaching 
federal bureaucracy.5 Over time, conditional funding grants have 
proven to be a popular policy tool. As Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Alito—the dissenting Justices—noted in NFIB, 
Congress increasingly grants money to states to accomplish its 
legislative objectives.6  
But the increased legislative popularity of such conditional 
spending obscures its drawbacks, notably the undermining of political 
accountability and the circumventing of limits on federal power.7 As 
 
4. Reply Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid at 5, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. 
Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-400).   
5. Id. (explaining that Congress benefits “by spending the federal money 
through States rather than new federal instrumentalities”). 
6. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2658 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., 
dissenting) (citing G. Ross Stephens & Nelson Wikstrom, 
American Intergovernmental Relations: A Fragmented 
Federal Polity 83 (2007)) (acknowledging the large increase of federal 
aid in absolute terms and as a percentage of state and local 
expenditures: from 11.6% in 1950 to 37.5% in 2010). 
7. Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J. 557, 
573–74, 584 (2000) (asserting that cooperative federalism arrangements, 
which include conditional spending schemes, erode political 
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American political institutions continue to embrace conditional 
funding, greater attention should be dedicated to the constitutional 
issues it raises. This Part tracks the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
these issues and identifies where the Court’s conditional spending 
jurisprudence stands today. 
A. Development of Conditional Spending Jurisprudence 
Congress’s power to spend money for the general welfare traces 
back to the Spending Clause.8 Nearly a century and a half after the 
Constitution’s adoption, however, the basic meaning of the clause 
remained open to debate. In the midst of the New Deal, the Supreme 
Court weighed two divergent stances on whether the spending power 
stands alone as a separate power, distinct from the other enumerated 
legislative powers.  
In United States v. Butler,9 the Court decided this issue and 
adopted an expansive view of the spending power.10 According to 
James Madison, the Constitution limits the power of Congress to 
spend only in support of its other Article I powers; in contrast, 
Alexander Hamilton viewed the Spending Clause as authorizing a 
separate power subject only to the broad limitation of furthering the 
general welfare.11 By definitively adopting Hamilton’s view, the Court 
greatly enhanced the federal government’s ability to spend, especially 
in light of the Court’s admitted reluctance to second-guess Congress.12 
Taking advantage of Butler’s broad interpretation of its spending 
power, Congress began to steadily increase its use of conditional 
spending to prompt and influence state action.13 But the Supreme 
 
accountability and sidestep the constitutional principle of dual 
federalism).  
8. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay 
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and 
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United 
States . . . .”). 
9. 297 U.S. 1 (1935).  
10. Id. at 65. The Court held the taxing authority at issue under the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 (1933), to 
be unconstitutional because it regulated intrastate agricultural 
production in violation of the Tenth Amendment. However, the Court 
undermined Butler’s Tenth Amendment holding just two years later. 
See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589–90 (1937). 
11. Butler, 297 U.S. at 65–66. 
12. Id. (reasoning that adopting Madison’s minimalist view would render 
the Spending Clause’s “general welfare” language a “mere tautology”).  
13. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).  
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Court shed little light on the topic for decades following the Butler 
decision.14  
The conditional spending doctrine’s development did not begin in 
earnest until 1981 in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. 
Halderman.15 In Pennhurst, residents of a state-operated facility for 
people with mental retardation asserted a claim under the 
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act,16 a 
federal grant program aimed at creating state programs to assist the 
developmentally disabled.17 Specifically, residents alleged that the 
facility failed to provide the minimum living conditions detailed in the 
Act’s “bill of rights” provision.18  
The Supreme Court attacked the provision’s language for failing 
to express that compliance with it served as a condition for the 
receipt of federal funds under the Act.19 Articulating a rare restraint 
on conditional spending, the Court analogized congressional 
conditional spending to contract law. Drawing from the concept of 
mutual assent, the Court asserted that the spending power depends 
“on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of 
the ‘contract.’”20 Thus, Congress must unambiguously express any 
condition on federal grants to states, or the courts will decline to 
enforce it.21 
Though Pennhurst limited Congress’s ability to attach conditions 
to its spending, it represented the exception rather than the rule. 
South Dakota v. Dole22 most completely articulates the modern 
conditional spending doctrine before NFIB and exemplifies the wide 
deference traditionally accorded to Congress in exercising its spending 
power. In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Dole Court 
 
14. But see, e.g., Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 135–
36 (1947) (recognizing Congress’s ability to fix the terms of funding 
granted to the states); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316–17 (1968) 
(same). 
15. 451 U.S. 1 (1981). 
16. Pub. L. No. 94-103, 89 Stat. 486 (1975) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)). 
17. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 5–6, 11. 
18. Id. at 6, 12–13. 
19. Id. at 12–13 (distinguishing the bill of rights provision, 
42 U.S.C. § 6010, from §§ 6005, 6009, 6011, and 6012). The Court 
upheld other provisions of the Act that clearly conditioned federal 
assistance on taking certain actions to facilitate the employment of 
people with disabilities.  
20. Id. at 17. 
21. Id. 
22. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
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upheld legislation that withheld a percentage of federal highway funds 
from states that set their minimum legal drinking ages below twenty-
one years.23  
Rehnquist outlined the basic framework for evaluating conditional 
spending, holding that conditions are valid as long as they satisfy four 
requirements.24 First, the spending must advance the “general 
welfare.” Second, as established in Pennhurst, the condition must be 
expressed unambiguously. Third, the condition must relate to federal 
interests in the spending program. Fourth, the spending cannot 
violate any other constitutional provision. In applying the framework, 
the Dole majority controversially found that the drinking age 
condition “directly related” to the funding’s purpose of improving the 
safety of interstate travel.25 By categorizing the seemingly tenuous 
relationship between minimum drinking ages and highway funding as 
direct, the Dole Court displayed significant deference to Congress in 
crafting funding conditions.26 
More important, however, the Court trumpeted an independent 
concern for congressional coercion. The Court expanded on language 
from Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,27 an earlier case in which the 
Court found that a condition did not cross “the point at which 
pressure turns into compulsion.”28 A half century after that decision, 
 
23. Id. at 206. The legislation at issue was 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2006) (allowing 
the Secretary to withhold funds if the legal purchase, possession, or 
drinking age is below twenty-one years). 
24. Id. at 207–08. 
25. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208–09. But see id. at 212–15 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s application of the relation 
requirement while approving the majority’s framework).  
26. See Michele Landis Dauber, Judicial Review and the Power of the 
Purse, 23 Law & Hist. Rev. 451, 452–53 (2005) (positing that the 
Supreme Court has exercised vast deference towards congressional 
spending since before the beginning of the twentieth century). 
Commentators have criticized not only Dole’s “directly related” 
reasoning but also later applications of that reasoning to conditions that 
bear a looser relation to the federal interest in the spending. See, e.g., 
Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal 
Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 447–50 (2005) 
(attacking court decisions upholding the Clean Air Act’s conditions on 
federal highway funds as sufficiently related to the federal interest of 
environmental protection). 
27. 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
28. Id. at 590. However, the Court doubted whether courts could determine 
with any precision the point at which a condition becomes coercive. For 
a conceptual explanation of coercive conditional spending and a related 
analytical framework, see Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without 
Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 Geo. 
L.J. 1 (2001).  
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Dole asserted that in certain circumstances federal conditional 
spending may turn from permissible encouragement into 
unconstitutional coercion.29 In evaluating coercion, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that South Dakota would lose only five percent of the 
funds otherwise available under the highway program, a very small 
percentage of the state’s total expenditures for all purposes. 
Therefore, the Court described the condition as “relatively mild 
encouragement.”30 
Four years later, the Supreme Court delved deeper into the 
rationales underlying coercion. In New York v. United States,31 the 
constitutionality of three sets of incentives under the Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 198532 was at stake. 
The first set of incentives, the “monetary incentives,” awarded states 
for achieving a series of waste-disposal milestones from a fund 
financed by a portion of surcharges paid by states exporting nuclear 
waste. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Dole framework by using it 
to find that this portion of the Act was a valid exercise of conditional 
spending.33 After the Court rejected the argument that the form of 
accounting for these expenditures violated the spending power, it 
upheld an otherwise straightforward exercise of conditional spending.34 
Nonetheless, the Court struck down another piece of the statute 
that imposed a negative incentive on states that did not regulate 
according to Congress’s instructions.35 The “take title” provision gave 
states the option of either regulating in line with Congress’s 
instructions or, alternatively, taking title and possession of the waste 
and bearing the liability for all damages suffered by waste generators. 
This provision, the Court found, unconstitutionally crossed the line 
from encouragement to coercion.36  
 
29. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. 
30. Id. 
31. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b–2021j (2006).  
33. New York, 505 U.S. at 171–73. 
34. See id. at 172 (responding to petitioner’s argument that keeping the 
funds in an account separate from the general treasury violates 
Congress’s spending power, Justice O’Connor stated, “[t]he 
Constitution’s grant to Congress of the authority to ‘pay the Debts and 
provide for the . . . general Welfare’ has never . . . been thought to 
mandate a particular form of accounting”). 
35. Id. at 174–75. 
36. Id. at 175. 
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Concern for state rights climbed to the forefront in the Court’s 
reasoning.37 As Justice O’Connor noted, “[T]he Constitution simply 
does not give Congress the authority to require the States to 
regulate.”38 Further, the Court addressed problems created by the 
take-title provision that apply equally to instances of conditional 
spending. 
First, the Court recognized the risk of disconnecting political 
accountability when Congress compels states to regulate.39 If states 
freely choose to take action, then state officials rightly remain 
accountable to their own citizens. But when Congress coerces states 
to act, as found in New York, citizens may wrongly hold state officials 
politically accountable for Congress’s political agenda.40 In other 
words, when state officials cease to act under their volition and 
instead carry out the orders of Congress, voters may nonetheless 
blame or credit state officials. 
Second, because coercion misdirects political accountability, the 
concern arises that coercion may promote political abuse. Federal 
officials possess an incentive to compel states to act because they can 
shift responsibility and its inherent burdens to the states. Without the 
coercion principle, members of Congress might overly rely on coercive 
federal spending programs and take refuge in a political safe harbor. 
Meanwhile, state legislators could plausibly deflect blame to Congress, 
further blurring the lines of political accountability. The New York 
Court anticipated the potential degradation into political tennis, 
especially in the context of radioactive waste disposal.41 It responded 
by asserting that state officials cannot consent to a congressional 
overreach.42 Though the Court did not strike down an exercise of 
conditional spending, it fortified the coercion principle recognized in 
Dole. These developments provided the foundation for the Supreme 
Court’s more rigorous approach to conditional spending in NFIB.  
37. See, e.g., id. at 188 (“States are not mere political subdivisions of the 
United States. . . . The positions occupied by state officials appear nowhere 
on the Federal Government’s most detailed organizational chart.”). 
38. Id. at 178. 
39. Id. at 168 (“[W]here the Federal Government compels States to 
regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is 
diminished.”). 
40. Id. at 168–69. 
41. Id. at 182 (“[T]he facts of these cases raise the possibility that powerful 
incentives might lead both federal and state officials to view departures 
from the federal structure to be in their personal interests. Most citizens 
recognize the need for radioactive waste disposal sites, but few want 
sites near their homes. . . . [I]t is likely to be in the political interests of 
each individual official to avoid being held accountable to the 
voters. . . .”).  
42. Id. at 182. 
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B. Crossing the Line: NFIB v. Sebelius 
NFIB garnered immense attention for its political ramifications. 
After the passing of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act43 
(ACA), many states challenged the validity of the individual mandate 
and the Medicaid expansion. Before the ACA, the Medicaid program 
offered conditional funding to the states to assist pregnant women, 
children, needy families, the blind, the elderly, and the disabled in 
obtaining medical care.44 Under the ACA, states receiving funding 
were required to extend coverage to any person under the age of 
sixty-five with an income below 133% of the federal poverty line at 
the beginning of 2014.45 As noted by Chief Justice Roberts, the 
provision would substantially increase the number of adults whom 
states must cover because states previously, on average, covered only 
unemployed parents who made less than thirty-seven percent of the 
poverty line and employed parents who made less than sixty-
three percent.46 
The Supreme Court produced three different opinions on the 
Medicaid expansion issue. Two opinions, representing seven Justices, 
concluded that the expansion was unconstitutionally coercive. Justices 
Ginsburg and Sotomayor concluded otherwise. Taken together, these 
opinions revitalize the coercion principle.47 The opinions provide some 
guidance as to how the coercion principle will be applied going 
forward, but that guidance is limited by the tailoring of the opinions 
to the ACA. Thus, to facilitate a discussion about the future of the 
coercion principle, the following subsections detail the reasoning of all 
three opinions. 
1. Chief Justice Roberts’s Opinion  
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, joined by Justices Breyer and 
Kagan, found that Congress unconstitutionally exercised its spending 
power through the Medicaid expansion’s conditional funding scheme.48 
The opinion advanced two bases for finding the provisions 
 
43. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2006). 
45. § 2001, 124 Stat. at 271 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396a beginning in 2014).  
46. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 (2012) 
(citing Martha Heberlein et al., Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid 
and the Uninsured: Performing Under Pressure 11 (2012)). 
47. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts 
Court, 58 Duke L.J. 345, 372–73 (2008) (predicting the Roberts Court 
will shy away from the coercion principle’s problematic line-drawing 
analysis).  
48. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (explaining that although Congress has broad 
spending power, it cannot surprise states with certain conditions). 
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unconstitutional. One focused on the coercive amount of funding; the 
other emphasized the condition’s retroactive effect. 
Chief Justice Roberts first confronted the issue of coercion. He 
contrasted the amount of federal Medicaid funding at stake under the 
ACA with the highway funding subject to the drinking age condition in 
Dole.49 More specifically, he contrasted the funding in proportion to 
overall state expenditures. In Dole, less than one percent of total 
South Dakotan expenditures was conditioned, whereas the ACA 
conditioned over ten percent of an average state’s budget.50 Because 
the ACA placed its conditions on a greater proportion of overall state 
expenditures, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the condition was 
“economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but 
to acquiesce.”51  
Chief Justice Roberts’s second basis builds on the premise that 
the Medicaid expansion would achieve a “shift in kind, not merely 
degree.”52 In other words, the ACA changes Medicaid in a manner 
that turns it into a program distinct from its prior form.53 Branching 
from that premise, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the ACA 
unconstitutionally placed a retroactive condition on funding.54 In his 
view, the ACA added an unexpected condition onto the Medicaid 
funding that states had already accepted. The ACA’s conditions were 
not a mere amendment to Medicaid that States could have 
anticipated when they joined the program. The Court derived the rule 
against retroactive conditions from Pennhurst as a corollary of the 
requirement that Congress “unambiguously express” funding 
conditions.55 By enacting a shift in kind, Congress imposed new 
 
49. Id. at 2604–05. 
50. Id. (citing Nat’l Ass’n of State Budget Officers, State 
Expenditure Report: Examining Fiscal 2010–2012 State 
Spending 11 tbl.5 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b) (2006)). 
51. Id. at 2605. 
52. Id. 
53. Chief Justice Roberts reached this conclusion primarily by emphasizing 
the change in design away from covering the four discrete categories of 
people originally covered: the disabled, the blind, the elderly, and needy 
families with dependent children. Id. at 2606 (“Under the Affordable 
Care Act, Medicaid is transformed into a program to meet the health 
care needs of the entire nonelderly population with income below 
133 percent of the poverty level. It is no longer a program to care for 
the neediest among us, but rather an element of a comprehensive 
national plan to provide universal health insurance coverage.”); see 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (2006). 
54. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606. 
55. Id. (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 
25 (1981)).  
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conditions that states could not have anticipated when they opted 
into the program.  
Despite some ambiguity regarding the relationship between the 
two bases in Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, both operate as a 
sufficient, independent basis for finding conditional spending 
unconstitutional. The Dole framework requires satisfaction of all four 
of its prongs.56 The Pennhurst “unambiguously express” requirement 
composes one prong within the framework.57 Thus, failure to meet 
that requirement alone would have rendered the provision 
unconstitutional. But Chief Justice Roberts declined to narrowly rest 
the holding solely on the Pennhurst requirement. Instead he 
reinvigorated the coercion principle, which Dole treated as a separate 
spending constraint. This move strongly suggests that the Court will 
more thoroughly scrutinize congressional conditional spending in the 
future. However, Chief Justice Roberts expressly declined to elaborate 
where the line that separates encouragement and unconstitutional 
coercion lies.58  
2. The Adjoined Opinion of Justices Scalia, Kennedy,  
Thomas, and Alito 
The opinion of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito59 
echoed much of Chief Justice Roberts’s coercion analysis. It 
emphasized the amount of funding at stake, though the dissenting 
Justices relied more broadly on budget figures. They argued that, as a 
practical matter, the “sheer size of this federal spending program in 
relation to state expenditures” makes it very difficult for states to 
replace lost federal funds through tax increases or other budget cuts.60 
Both the dissenting Justices and Chief Justice Roberts used figures 
 
56. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987). 
57. Id. Despite Chief Justice Roberts’s citation to Pennhurst in explaining 
the “shift in kind” theory, some commentators mistakenly attribute the 
theory to coercion analysis. See, e.g., Megan Ix, Note, National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius: The Misguided 
Application and Perpetuation of an Amorphous Coercion Theory, 
72 Md. L. Rev. 1415, 1441–43 (2013) (treating the retroactivity of a 
“shift in kind” as a new criterion of coercion).  
58. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (“We have no need to fix a line either. It is 
enough today that wherever that line may be, this state is surely 
beyond that.”). 
59. Id. at 2657 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). This 
Note refers to this opinion as the “adjoining opinion” in recognition of 
the fact that seven of the Justices found the Medicaid expansion 
unconstitutional. In addition, this Note refers to Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito as the “dissenting Justices.” 
60. Id. at 2663. 
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from the same report to show how important federal Medicaid 
funding is to states’ total spending.61  
To highlight state reliance on Medicaid funding, the adjoining 
opinion mentioned that federal funding for elementary and secondary 
education equals only 6.6% of total state spending versus almost 
twenty-two percent for Medicaid.62 Importantly for this Note, while 
federal Medicaid funding to states certainly exceeds education 
funding, the opinion did not suggest how the Court would rule on 
coercion in respect to federal education spending. Education funding 
simply served as the ideal contrast because it is the next biggest 
federal funding item to states. 
The adjoining opinion included an argument relating to the 
difficulty of replacing federal funding. When the federal government 
supports a grant program by levying a heavy tax, states lose the 
ability and the willingness to tax their constituents further.63 Under 
such a program, a new tax in a nonparticipating state must tack on 
to federal taxes paid by residents, who then subsidize the federal 
program in other states.64 State legislators would incur a higher 
political cost by deciding to tax an already heavily tapped tax base. 
Thus, especially in situations of widespread national acceptance, 
states face immense pressure to acquiesce even if they deem a 
program inefficient and ineffective.65 Altogether, the adjoining opinion 
stresses the states’ reliance on federal funding and the impracticality 
of replacing the federal funds to accomplish the same objective.  
The dissenting Justices additionally argued that the stated goal 
and structure of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion evidenced intent to 
 
61. See, e.g., id. at 2662–63 (citing State Expenditure Report: 
Examining Fiscal 2010–2012 State Spending 7 (2012)) (noting that 
in 2010 the federal government granted $223 billion to the states for 
preexpansion Medicaid, which equaled nearly twenty-two percent of all 
state expenditures). 
62. Id. at 2663 (citing State Expenditure Report: Examining Fiscal 
2010–2012 State Spending 7, 16 (2012)).  
63. Id. at 2661–62; see also Reply Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid 
at 19, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) 
(No. 11-400) (“Coercion is measured by a State’s ability to withstand 
the loss of the inducement at stake.”).  
64. The fact that all states participate in Medicaid does not defeat this 
point. A state’s residents pay federal taxes regardless of its participation 
in Medicaid. Thus, the state must use the federal dollars collected from 
its residents or lose those funds. A state desiring to opt out of Medicaid 
may be compelled to stay in the program to avoid losing out on money 
collected from its own tax base. In other words, the rationale underlying 
the coercion principle applies both when a state first decides to accept 
federal conditional funds and when a state later decides whether to 
continue accepting those funds.  
65. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2661–62. 
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coerce.66 To the dissenting Justices, the ACA’s expressed goal and the 
lack of backup scheme demonstrated Congress’s knowledge that it had 
designed an offer the states could not refuse.67 Overall, though, they 
relied primarily on budgetary arguments about the amount of 
Medicaid funding at stake and the concerns underlying coercion. 
3. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent 
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, wrote the lone 
opinion upholding the Medicaid expansion.68 Because the Court 
divided seven to two on this issue, this opinion bears little weight. 
Moreover, Justice Ginsburg focused her criticism on the majority’s 
shift-in-kind premise, not the coercion principle.69 She found Medicaid, 
including the ACA’s expansion, to be a single program.  
Justice Ginsburg mentioned that Congress has amended the 
Medicaid program more than fifty times, sometimes significantly.70 
Because the federal government provides much of the funding for the 
ACA expansion, the financial burdens born by the states change 
minimally; thus, the Act’s Medicaid expansion does not significantly 
 
66. Id. at 2664–66. First, the expansion’s goal was to provide near-universal 
health care coverage, which Congress can accomplish only with full state 
acceptance. Id. at 2664. If states refused to expand their Medicaid 
programs to include all adults below 133% of the federal poverty line, 
then the ACA’s goal would be impeded. Id. at 2665. Second, Congress 
omitted any type of backup scheme for when states declined the funding 
for the expansion. The adjoining opinion noted that Congress would 
have created a backup if it thought states could refuse to accept funding 
to implement a health benefit exchange. Id. 
67. Id. at 2666. The federal government argued that Congress’s anticipation 
of full participation was based on the notion that the expansion offered 
exceedingly favorable terms to the states. However, Justice Scalia 
rejected the argument because of the phased-in costs that participating 
states would bear. But Justice Scalia’s reasoning that congressional 
intent helps to prove coercion is dubious. Congressional intent to design 
a conditional funding program to coerce states to act should not affect 
the analysis of whether the scheme actually accomplished that effect. 
The Supreme Court defines constitutional boundaries, not Congress.  
68. Id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Because Justice Ginsburg 
would have upheld the Medicaid expansion as a constitutional exercise 
of Congress’s spending power, this Note refers to her opinion as the 
dissent for purposes of this issue.  
69. Id. at 2630 (“Congress is simply requiring States to do what States have 
long been required to do to receive Medicaid funding: comply with the 
conditions Congress prescribes for participation.”). 
70. Id. at 2631–32 (placing particular emphasis on coverage expansions for 
pregnant women and the large increase in annual federal Medical 
expenditures over the long run). 
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differ from past expansions.71 In addition, Congress expressly reserved 
“[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision” of the Medicaid 
program.72 And states acknowledged that right by agreeing to change 
their respective plans in accordance with changes in federal law.73 To 
Justice Ginsburg, Congress exercised its spending power within the 
parameters of Pennhurst by merely amending an existing program.  
Besides the separate-program premise, Justice Ginsburg took issue 
with Chief Justice Roberts’s contention that the terms of the 
conditions were not unambiguously expressed. Based on state 
acknowledgment of Congress’s express authority and the history of 
Medicaid expansions, she argued that states could hardly be surprised 
by the ACA’s terms. Moreover, she asserted that the analysis should 
focus on the ACA’s expression of conditions, not the conditions 
expressed in the original Medicaid legislation.74  
Lastly, she flatly declined to engage in the sort of statistical 
federalism analysis that defined the other opinions. In response to 
Justices Chief Justice Roberts’s and Justice Scalia’s coercion analyses, 
Justice Ginsburg contended that the political question doctrine 
precludes the Court from engaging in the analysis due to the lack of 
judicial competence.75  
II. Federal Involvement in Elementary  
and Secondary Education 
Federal involvement in elementary and secondary education is 
hardly an overnight development. Paralleling Congress’s steady 
expansion into health care, Congress has increasingly claimed 
education as a prerogative it shares with the states. Initially, the 
federal government did little more than voice encouragement for 
education. Today, Congress serves as a key player rather than a 
booster. This evolution invokes the primary purpose of the conditional 
spending principle: to prevent Congress from overstepping the bounds 
of federalism. Defining where those boundaries lie demands 
consideration of how the federal role in education has evolved. Thus, 
to inform an application of the coercion principle to education 
spending, this Part summarizes the key steps in Congress’s expansion 
into education.  
 
71. Id. (mentioning that federal funds will cover all of the costs for newly 
eligible recipients in 2014 and will phase down to ninety percent by 2020). 
72. 42 U.S.C § 1304 (2006). 
73. See 42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c)(i) (2013). 
74. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2638. 
75. Id. at 2640–41 (“The coercion inquiry . . . appears to involve political 
judgments that defy judicial calculation.”). 
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A. Tradition of State Control 
The Tenth Amendment declares that “[t]he powers not delegated 
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”76 For 
much of America’s history, states led the development of public 
education, in part because the Constitution does not enumerate 
education as a federal power.77 Based on an understanding that 
Congress lacked power to regulate education, states generally detailed 
the structure of their educational systems in their own constitutions.78 
In fact, each state’s constitution at the very least mentions 
education.79  
In America’s early years, Congress occasionally influenced public 
education through indirect initiatives.80 Shortly before the adoption of 
the Constitution, the federal government passed a series of ordinances 
to organize the development of the Northwest Territory.81 For 
example, a 1785 ordinance82 required each newly created township to 
 
76. U.S. Const. amend. X. 
77. Stephen B. Thomas et al., Public School Law: Teachers’ and 
Students’ Rights 2 (Stephen D. Dragin ed., 6th ed. 2009). 
78. James D. Koerner, Who Controls American Education? A 
Guide for Laymen 79 (1968); see also William E. Thro, An Essay: 
The School Finance Paradox: How the Constitutional Values of 
Decentralization and Judicial Restraint Inhibit the Achievement of 
Quality Education, 197 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 477, 482 (2005) 
(reviewing the types of education provisions included in state 
constitutions from single clauses promising free education to detailed 
descriptions of the state’s education system).  
79. Michael D. Barolsky, Note, High Schools Are Not Highways: How Dole 
Frees States From the Unconstitutional Coercion of No Child Left 
Behind, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 725, 742 (2008); see also Peter Enrich, 
Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 
48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 105 (1995) (remarking that each state, except 
arguably Mississippi, includes an “education clause” in its constitution). 
The current version of Mississippi’s constitution reads “[t]he legislature 
shall, by general law, provide for the establishment, maintenance and 
support of free public schools upon such conditions and limitation as the 
Legislature may prescribe.” Miss. Const. art. VIII, § 201. 
80. See Koerner, supra note 78, at 4–5 (listing federal laws implicating 
education up through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27). 
81. See, e.g., Continental Congress Ordinance of May 20, 1785 
(ascertaining the mode of disposing of Lands in the Western Territory), 
reprinted in 28 Journals of the Continental Congress 375 (John 
Fitzpatrick ed., 1933).  
82. Id.  
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reserve a section of land for a public school.83 More than eighty years 
and the Civil War passed before Congress created the Department of 
Education in 1867.84 Initially not a cabinet-level department, the 
agency lacked the policy-making authority commonly held by its 
European counterparts.85 Instead, the department’s mission centered 
on collecting statistics and distributing information.86 A later example 
of indirect influence comes from the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act 
of 1944.87 The Act, known as the G.I. Bill, and its successors88 
financed college and vocational educations for numerous military 
veterans without actually regulating the educations themselves.89 
The federal government held little more than a fringe role in 
education until the 1960s.90 During the nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century, public schooling spread dramatically across the 
states without much direction or assistance from the federal 
government.91 From 1890 to 1920, the number of students attending 
 
83. Id. Two years later, the federal government provided that “[r]eligion, 
morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the 
happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever 
be encouraged.” Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. III, reprinted in 
1 U.S.C. LVII, LIX (2012).  
84. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 158, § 1, 14 Stat. 434, 434. 
85. William J. Reese, America’s Public Schools: From the Common 
Schools to “No Child Left Behind” 45–46 (Stanley I. Kutler ed., 
updated ed. 2011); see also Koerner, supra note 78, at 9–12 
(explaining the limited informational purposes of the agency and 
detailing its troubled beginnings). 
86. § 1, 14 Stat. at 434 (“[T]here shall be established . . . a department of 
education, for the purpose of collecting such statistics and facts as shall 
show the condition and progress of education in the several States and 
Territories, and of diffusing such information respecting the organization 
and management of school and school systems, and methods of 
teaching . . . .”). 
87. Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 38 U.S.C.) (commonly known as the G.I. Bill). 
88. See generally Cassandria Dortch, Cong. Research Serv., GI 
Bills Enacted Prior to 2008 and Related Vetrans’ 
Educational Assistance Programs: A Primer 4 tbl.1 (2012) 
(summarizing the educational assistance programs, beginning with the 
G.I. Bill). 
89. See, e.g., § 400, 58 Stat. at 287–90 (establishing the mechanics of the 
G.I. Bill’s education program, including the states’ ability to designate 
qualified educational and training institutions).  
90. Thomas et al., supra note 77, at 12 (describing funding laws that were 
passed to provide financial assistance to schools). 
91. Reese, supra note 85, at 45–46, 63–64. The ideal of the common school, 
particularly the free high school, motivated the expansion. Notable 
advocates for the common school, namely Horace Mann, William Harris, 
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American high schools increased from two hundred thousand to 
nearly two million.92 In the early twentieth century, America led 
western nations in postsecondary enrollment rates.93 The decentralized 
structure of America’s education system accelerated its rapid 
expansion.94 Still today, upwards of fourteen thousand school districts, 
ninety-six thousand schools, and 3 million teachers continue to make 
key decisions that most directly impact the classroom.95  
B. “War on Poverty” Era: Expansion of the Federal Role in Education 
By the 1960s, the tradition of state dominance in education 
started to erode. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 
196596 (ESEA) represents the beginning of increased federal 
involvement in education. The original ESEA doubled the amount of 
federal aid to education and steadily increased the proportion of total 
education spending supplied by the federal government.97 The law 
aimed to supplement state efforts to educate economically 
disadvantaged students.98 To this end, under the original ESEA, 
 
and John Dewey, argued that common schools would promote social 
equality, reduce crime, and reinforce good morals.  
92. Edward A. Krug, The Shaping of the American High School 
11, 439 (1964). 
93. Claudia Goldin, The Human-Capital Century and American Leadership: 
Virtues of the Past, 61 J. ECON. HIST. 263, 265 (2001).  
94. Id. at 284. Goldin explains that even if a significant minority supported 
postsecondary education expansion, this desired expansion would not 
occur in a centralized system until support grew to a national majority. In 
a decentralized system, however, the significant minority could expand 
postsecondary education in localities where it constituted a majority. Id. 
In the decentralized system, it follows that because localities expanding 
postsecondary education would gain a comparative advantage over 
neighboring area, a “race to the top” situation would ensue.  
95. Susan H. Fuhrman et al., Educational Governance in the United States: 
Where Are We? How Did We Get Here? Why Should We Care?, in 
The State of Education Policy Research 41, 41 (Susan H. 
Fuhrman et al. eds., 2007). 
96. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 20 U.S.C.). 
97. Thomas et al., supra note 77, at 12. 
98. See sec. 2, § 201, 79 Stat. at 27 (designating as Title I the Act of 
September 30, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-874, 64 Stat. 1100, creating a separate 
Title II, and declaring in the new Title II that United States policy is “to 
provide financial assistance (as set forth in this title) to local educational 
agencies serving areas with concentrations of children from low-income 
families to expand and improve their educational programs”); Indep. 
Review Panel, Improving the Odds: A Report on Title I from 
the Independent Review Panel 2 (2001). 
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extended federal funds to school districts servicing high proportions of 
children from low-income families.99 
ESEA established relatively modest conditions for receipt of 
federal funding. Schools receiving funding were obligated to use the 
money to extend remedial reading and math instruction services.100 
States retained the option to decline federal funds for specific 
programs as opposed to risking all federal education funding for a 
refusal to participate in a single program.101  
In the decades following the passage of the original ESEA, 
Congress slowly broadened the federal government’s role in 
education.102 The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 
1975103 required states receiving federal funds to effectuate policies to 
provide students with disabilities a “free appropriate public 
education.”104 In 1979, Congress reconstituted the U.S. Office of 
Education, which had been demoted to an executive office one year 
after its creation,105 into the cabinet-level Department of Education.106  
The National Commission on Excellence in Education’s landmark 
report, A Nation at Risk,107 incited nationwide concern for education 
and effectively launched a movement focusing on developing higher 
 
99. Sec. 2, §§ 203–204, 79 Stat. at 28–30. 
100. See sec. 2, § 205(a), 79 Stat. at 30–31 (limiting the ways local 
educational agencies can use ESEA grants and setting basic reporting 
requirements).  
101. Sec. 2, § 210, 79 Stat. at 33–34. 
102. See John F. Jennings, Title I: Its Legislative History and Its Promise, in 
Title I: Compensatory Education at the Crossroads 1, 14–15 
(Geoffrey D. Borman et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the history of ESEA 
and its reauthorizations). 
103. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (amending the Education and 
Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, § 601, 84 Stat. 121, 175 (1970)) 
(current version at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012)). 
104. Sec. 5, § 612, 89 Stat. at 780 (current version at 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) 
(2012)).  
105. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Overview of the U.S. Department of 
Education 3 (2010). 
106. Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 201, 
93 Stat. 668, 671 (1979). Although the Act committed additional federal 
resources to education, it did so with the understanding that none of the 
Department’s programs would allow federal officers to exercise any 
control over curriculum, program of instruction, and other matters of 
local school administration such as personnel or textbooks. § 103, 
93 Stat. at 670–71. 
107. Nat’l Comm’n on Excellence in Educ., A Nation at Risk: The 
Imperative for Educational Reform (1983) [hereinafter A Nation 
at Risk]. 
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standards.108 In 1994, Congress pushed along the standards movement 
with two laws. First, the Goals 2000: Educate America Act109 
extended federal money to states for drafting their own academic 
standards.110 Second, the Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994111 
reauthorized and amended ESEA in line with the standards-based 
reform principles outlined in Goals 2000.112 
C. Modern Scheme: No Child Left Behind 
Riding the coattails of the standards movement,113 Congress 
enacted the currently controlling version of ESEA, the No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2001114 (NCLB). The law passed easily through 
Congress with bipartisan support and markedly increased federal 
 
108. See Diane Ravitch, The Death and Life of the Great American 
School System: How Testing and Choice Are Undermining 
Education 24–30 (2010) (voicing mostly support of A Nation at Risk 
and crediting the report with launching the standards movement in 
education). Setting the tone for the report, the first paragraph straightly 
stated that “the educational foundations of our society are presently being 
eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a 
Nation and a people.” A Nation at Risk, supra note 107, at 9. 
109. Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat. 125 (1994) (amending ESEA) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
110. § 306(a), (c), 108 Stat. at 160, 162–64. But see Ravitch, supra 
note 108, at 17–19 (arguing that most states drafted vague, unsubstantial 
standards following a successful attack on history standards drafted by 
University of California, Los Angeles historians). An opinion piece in the 
Wall Street Journal, written by the former chairperson of the National 
Endowment for the Humanities, triggered a national media firestorm that 
led the Clinton administration to abandon the national standards. See 
generally Lynne V. Cheney, Op-Ed., The End of History, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 20, 1994, at A22 (strongly criticizing the national standards for 
political bias); see also RAVITCH, supra note 108, at 17 (discussing 
Cheney’s argument the effects). On the other hand, Ravitch, who viewed 
the state standards as flawed but fixable, argues that the national-
standards battle discouraged states from writing substantive standards 
that would polarize constituents. Id. at 19. 
111. Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
112. See sec. 101, § 1111, 108 Stat. at 3523 (allowing the standards created 
by states under Goals 2000 to satisfy the requirement that states adopt 
“challenging content standards and challenging student performance 
standards”). 
113. See Ravitch, supra note 108, at 29–30 (contending that assessment-
based reforms replaced the standards movement in the mid-1990’s upon 
the states’ unwillingness to develop demanding, concrete standards).  
114. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
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control over education.115 NCLB touches essentially every program 
created under the prior ESEA and goes further.116  
Similar to prior versions of ESEA, NCLB’s funding scheme 
demands that states satisfy statutory provisions to receive federal 
funds.117 While stakeholders and interest groups have taken issue with 
a number of the provisions added by NCLB, no provisions have 
generated more animosity and controversy than those pertaining to 
academic assessment.118 To receive NCLB funds, each state must 
develop “challenging academic content standards and challenging 
student academic achievement standards” for “mathematics, reading 
or language arts, and . . . science.”119 From those standards, states 
must design and administer annual standardized assessments to all 
students in grades three through eight.120 The assessment results then 
serve as a primary indicator of yearly performance within a single, 
statewide accountability system that meets an array of federal 
requirements.121 Under the accountability system requirements, 
schools must achieve “adequate yearly progress” (AYP), a state-
defined threshold,122 or incur sanctions. Potential sanctions include 
 
115. Lizette Alvarez, House Votes for New Testing to Hold Schools 
Accountable, N.Y. Times, May 24, 2001, at A1, A20. The bill passed 
the House of Representatives 384 to 45. 
116. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No Child Left Behind: A Desktop 
Reference 9 (2002).  
117. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 6316(a)(1) (2006). For previous ESEA conditions, 
see supra Part II.B.   
118. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 107-063, pt. 1, at 1240 (2001) (“[W]e remain 
concerned that the bill goes too far in its reliance on standardized 
testing.”); Michael Winerip, On Education: Teachers, and a Law That 
Distrusts Them, N.Y. Times, July 12, 2006, at B8 (expressing the 
concern that time-intensive standardized testing detracts from students’ 
opportunity to pursue subjects tailored to their interests). See generally 
Ravitch, supra note 108 (questioning the accuracy of standardized 
testing results and the perverse incentives high-pressure testing creates 
for teachers and administrators). 
119. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(1)(A),(C) (2012).  
120. Id. § 6311(b)(3)(C)(vii).  
121. Id. § 6311(b)(2). After disaggregating and categorizing the score data to 
facilitate tracking of specific populations, states must publicly release the 
assessment results. See id. § 6311(b)(3)(C)(xiii), (h)(1)(C)(i)–(ii) (listing 
the information states must include on their annual report cards).  
122. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(A)–(C). Under § 6311(b)(2), states possess the 
incentive to set AYP standards low so their constituent districts can 
maximize their federal funding, which places less pressure on the state 
to provide supplemental funding. As a result, the standards developed 
pursuant to NCLB have been varied and often disappointingly low. See 
G. Gage Kingsbury et al., Nw. Evaluation Ass’n, The State of 
State Standards: Research Investigating Proficiency Levels 
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forcing schools to offer in-district public school transfers,123 requiring 
the provision of “supplemental educational services,”124 and 
restructuring.125 
Critical to any discussion of coercion, NCLB’s conditions function 
differently from prior ESEA conditions in two important respects. 
First, some of NCLB’s requirements apply to all schools in a state, 
including those not receiving federal money.126 For schools that do not 
receive federal funding as bargained-for consideration, those 
requirements seemingly transform from conditions into regulations.127 
Second, at least in practice, NCLB conditions funding on the 
satisfaction of a bundle of its provisions.128 Unlike the original ESEA, 
states lack the option to select which specific federal programs they 
would independently adopt.129 This bundling raises the potential that 
a state would rationally accept what it views to be an unwanted 
 
in Fourteen States 11, 19 tbl.7 (2004) (noting that the states’ 
proficiency levels for standards and assessments vary greatly).  
123. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(E) (2012). 
124. Id. § 6316(b)(5)(B). 
125. Id. § 6316(b)(8)(B). After a school fails to meet AYP for three 
consecutive years, a school district must either (1) reopen the school as 
a public charter school, (2) replace all or most of the staff who are 
relevant to the failure to make AYP, (3) contract with an entity such as 
a private management company, (4) turn over the school’s operations to 
the state, or (5) implement “[a]ny other major restructuring of the 
school’s governance arrangement that makes fundamental reforms.” Id. 
126. Ronald D. Wenkart, The No Child Left Behind Act and Congress’ 
Power to Regulate Under the Spending Clause, 174 WEST’S EDUC. L. 
REP. 589, 590 (2003). Wenkart explains that NCLB required states 
receiving Title I funds to develop academic standards that must apply 
to all public schools in the state whether or not they receive those funds. 
Id. ESEA did demand a state plan for funds received under Title II, but 
those plans needed to set forth only how the state will administer and 
protect the funds for textbooks and other education material. 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 
sec. 5, § 203(a), 79 Stat. 27, 37–38. Thus, the ESEA state plans did not 
apply to and regulate localities through the proxy of the state. 
127. See id. 
128. See Barolsky, supra note 79, at 737–40, 745 (explaining that while 
NCLB’s text merely calls for the Secretary of Education to withhold 
payment without defining what payment to withhold, Department of 
Education practice has forced states to comply with all NCLB 
provisions to receive federal funding); Gina Austin, Note, Leaving 
Federalism Behind: How the No Child Left Behind Act Usurps States’ 
Rights, 27 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 337, 367 (2005) (asserting that 
noncompliance with NCLB could result in the loss of a state’s Title I 
funding and twice that amount in other categorical funds). 
129. See sec. 2, § 210, 79 Stat. at 33–34 (allowing for withholding of Title I 
funds for failing to meet certain Title I requirements).  
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regulation because it amounts to a cost associated with a beneficial 
program. 
Several states have challenged NCLB’s provisions. In 2005, 
Connecticut sued the Secretary of Education after she refused to allow 
the state to deviate from NCLB’s assessment regime.130 The 
Connecticut Mastery Test scheme at issue differed from the NCLB 
scheme in several respects, including the grade-levels of the test 
takers.131 Though the court dismissed the action for lack of 
jurisdiction, the case exemplifies states’ distaste for losing control over 
their education systems. Shortly after the Connecticut suit, the 
Fairfax County School Board decided not to give four thousand 
recent immigrant students the same NCLB-mandated test given to 
English-speaking students.132 Despite initial support from Virginia’s 
Superintendent of Public Instruction, the district administered the 
test after the federal Deputy Secretary of Education threatened to 
withhold all of the county’s federal educational assistance.133 Though 
Virginia and Connecticut’s struggles epitomize states’ frustration with 
NCLB, other states have resisted as well.134  
As NCLB remains in effect, the federal government has sought 
other means to influence education. Interestingly, the financial crisis 
of the late 2000s created an opportunity for the Obama 
administration to place its stamp on education. The American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,135 which aimed at stabilizing 
 
130. Connecticut v. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 459 (D. Conn. 2006), aff'd as 
modified sub nom. Connecticut v. Duncan, 612 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2010).  
131. Nicole Liguori, Leaving No Child Behind (Except in States That Don’t 
Do As We Say): Connecticut’s Challenge to the Federal Government’s 
Power to Control State Education Policy Through the Spending Clause, 
47 B.C. L. Rev. 1033, 1054 (2006) (noting that Connecticut requires 
public school students in fourth, sixth, and eighth grades to take the 
Connecticut Mastery Test, while NCLB requires that students be tested 
every year from third through eighth grade and at least once in tenth 
through twelfth grade). 
132. Maria Glod, Fairfax Resists “No Child” Provision: Immigrants’ Tests in 
English at Issue, Wash. Post, Jan. 26, 2007, at B1. School board 
members felt that administering the test to immigrant students would 
set them up for failure. One member stated, “It is wrong for our 
students to take a test they are predisposed to fail.” Id. 
133. Maria Glod, Fairfax Schools Concede on Testing: Comprise Made on 
Limited English, Wash. Post, Apr. 19, 2007, at B1. 
134. See, e.g., Jeff Archer, Connecticut Files Court Challenge to NCLB, 
Educ. Wk., Aug. 31, 2005, at 23, 27 (mentioning that Utah passed a 
measure giving its state education law precedence over federal law and 
that Colorado law offers financial protection to districts opting out of 
NCLB’s requirements).  
135. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (codified in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.).  
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the American economy, created the Race to the Top program.136 
Similar to NCLB, the program influenced states to adopt a federally 
endorsed set of education reforms, but it employed a different 
mechanism to exact its influence. The Secretary of Education awarded 
Race to the Top funds—$4.35 billion137—based on state applications 
in a competitive process. Forty states applied in the program’s first 
round, and only two were awarded funding.138 The second round 
resulted in ten winners from a pool of thirty-five applicants.139 A much 
smaller third round concluded in December 2011.140  
The full implications of the Race to the Top program extend 
beyond the scope of this Note. While the program prompted states to 
adopt certain reforms, the program does not trigger the same coercion 
issues as NCLB. Many states opted to not participate. And of the 
states that applied, less than a third received funding.141 Relevant to a 
coercion assessment of NCLB, Congress separately authorized and 
funded Race to the Top. Thus, the program has not diverted federal 
money away from NCLB’s conditional funding scheme. 
In September 2011, a decade after Congress passed NCLB, the 
Obama administration announced a NCLB waiver plan that would 
waive states’ failure to meet the requirement that all students achieve 
proficiency in math and language arts by 2014.142 To obtain a waiver 
under the plan, states had to agree to separate conditions related to 
academic standards and intervention in troubled schools. The waivers 
go into effect for the 2013–14 school year, with a one-year extension 
 
136. § 14006, 123 Stat. at 283–84. The Act also included a much larger 
educational appropriation that was distributed based on preexisting 
statutory formulas. § 14002(a)(2)(A)(i), 123 Stat. at 279–80.  
137. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Race to the Top Program Executive 
Summary 2 (2009). 
138. Alyson Klein, Obama Uses Funding, Executive Muscle to Make Often-
Divisive Agenda a Reality, Educ. Wk., June 13, 2012, at 1. 
139. Id. 
140. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Department of Education Awards 
$200 Million to Seven States to Advance K–12 Reform (Dec. 23, 2011); 
see also Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing 
Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-10, § 1832, 125 Stat. 38, 163–
64 (appropriating funding for the third round). 
141. An argument could be made that Congress coerces the states with this 
type of competitive grant arrangement. The prospect of funding itself 
has a value. Similar to tort damages for loss of opportunity, the value of 
potential funding could be discounted by the probability that the state 
will receive limited or no funding. However, under the Supreme Court’s 
current jurisprudence, much more money would need to be at stake 
before coercion would become an issue.  
142. Michele McNeil & Alyson Klein, Obama Outlines NCLB Flexibility, 
Educ. Wk., Sept. 28, 2011, at 1.  
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option.143 States receiving a waiver must still comply with other 
NCLB conditions. While the U.S. Department of Education denied 
some state’s waiver requests, at least forty-one states have obtained 
these waivers.144 Ironically, the waiver’s purported added flexibility 
has transformed into another avenue of federal muscle, as the 
Department seeks to impose higher requirements for states to obtain 
future NCLB relief.145 
D. Pending Reauthorization of the ESEA-NCLB Regime 
As of April 2013, Congress has neglected to meaningfully advance 
reauthorization legislation.146 NCLB attracted bipartisan support in 
the unique political environment that followed September 11, 2001, 
with members of Congress supporting it as an act of partisan unity.147 
Congress enacted NCLB for an initial term of five years that expired 
in 2007, but the law remains in effect until Congress modifies or 
eliminates it.148  
Given Congress’s recent aversion to long-term compromises, the 
reauthorization process promises to be contentious and drawn-out.149 
 
143. Id.  
144. Michele McNeil, Arne Duncan Attaches More Strings to NCLB Waiver 
Renewal, Educ. Wk.: Blogs (Aug. 29, 2013, 1:00 PM), 
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2013/08/barring_reaut
horization_this_m.html. 
145. Id. (reporting that Secretary of Education Arne Duncan will impose 
tougher requirements for states to obtain future NCLB waivers). 
146. See Alyson Klein, Top K–12 Leader in Congress Sets Departure Date, 
Educ. Wk., Feb. 6, 2013, at 20 (describing ESEA renewal as “long-
stalled” and mentioning that Senator Harkin, a leader on education issues 
and serving his final term, may focus more attention on reauthorizing the 
Individuals with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 
(codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012))). 
147. Elizabeth H. DeBray, Politics, Ideology, & Education: 
Federal Policy During the Clinton and Bush Administrations 
117 (2006).  
148. Regina R. Umpstead & Elizabeth Kirby, Reauthorization Revisited: 
Framing the Recommendations for the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act’s Reauthorization in Light of No Child Left Behind’s 
Implementation Challenges, 276 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 1, 3 (2012).  
149. For an in-depth analysis of the political and institutional considerations 
impeding ESEA reauthorization, see Elizabeth DeBray & Eric A. 
Houck, A Narrow Path Through the Broad Middle: Mapping 
Institutional Consideration for ESEA Reauthorization, 86 Peabody J. 
Educ. 319, 334–35 (2011). DeBray and Houck correctly predicted that 
the 112th Congress would not pass an ESEA reauthorization bill after 
analyzing factors like congressional polarization, degree of party control, 
new leadership and committee composition, and the rising influence of 
education think tanks. Id. Many of these impediments apply equally to 
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Congressional lassitude will add to the already conflicting views about 
what is best for American education.150 In March 2010, the Obama 
administration released A Blueprint for Reform: The Reauthorization 
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act151 in an attempt to 
guide congressional deliberations. The Blueprint’s approach maintains 
many of NCLB’s core policies while incorporating some of the reforms 
endorsed in the Race to the Top program.152 The Blueprint also calls 
for a continuation of the Race to the Top program.153  
If Congress incorporates Race to the Top in the renewed ESEA, 
then less money may be distributed via the traditional conditional 
spending model. A decrease in conditional funding under ESEA will 
weaken the argument that it is unconstitutionally coercive. However, 
the Blueprint has sparked little progress,154 and recent budgetary 
trends suggest that federal conditional spending for education will not 
decrease.155 
This Note’s coercion analysis incorporates NCLB spending figures. 
Unless ESEA reauthorization dramatically cuts federal conditional 
spending for education, the same case for unconstitutional coercion 
will persist. Conversely, increased federal conditional spending under 
ESEA will only strengthen the case for coercion.  
 
the current 113th Congress, suggesting that ESEA will continue to dwell 
in a state of congressional purgatory.  
150. Compare Benjamin Michael Superfine, Stimulating School Reform: The 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and the Shifting Federal Role 
in Education, 76 MO. L. REV. 81, 131–32 (2011) (advocating for 
principle-based guidelines over a set of rigidly defined best practices), 
with Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Case for a Collaborative 
Enforcement Model for a Federal Right to Education, 40 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 1653, 1719–20 (2007) (contending that the federal government 
should build on the set of best practices that it currently provides). 
151. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., A Blueprint for Reform: The 
Reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act (2010). 
152. Id. at 3–6 (noting that the Blueprint builds on the following key 
priorities: “(1) College- and Career-Ready Students; (2) Great Teachers 
and Leaders in Every School; (3) Equity and Opportunity for All 
Students; (4) Raise the Bar and Reward Excellence; [and] (5) Promote 
Innovation and Continuous Improvement”).  
153. Id. at 36 (stating that the Blueprint is modeled after the Race to the 
Top program). 
154. In 2011, Senators Tom Harkin and Michael Enzi sponsored a 
reauthorization bill that adopted many of the Blueprint’s suggested changes, 
but the bill was soundly defeated. See Klein, supra note 138, at 20.  
155. See discussion infra Part IV.C; see also Umpstead & Kirby, supra 
note 148, at 24–25 (contending that the reauthorization debate has been 
framed as building on the NCLB’s foundational principles). 
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III. Federal Courts and Conditional Funding  
for Education 
In recent years, federal courts have sought to reign in federal 
overreaching in education by invoking the conditional spending 
doctrine. The following three cases suggest that federal courts will be 
willing to apply NFIB’s analysis to a case involving conditional 
spending for education. 
The Supreme Court rigorously applied the conditional spending 
doctrine in Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. 
Murphy.156 In Murphy, parents who prevailed on a claim filed under 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act157 (IDEA) sought to 
recover fees for an education consultant’s services used in the 
action.158 The relevant section of IDEA provided that the district 
court “may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” to 
parents prevailing in a claim under the statute.159 At issue was 
whether the statute provided for fee shifting of payments to experts.  
The Court strictly enforced Pennhurst’s requirement that 
Congress impose funding conditions unambiguously.160 Justice Alito 
averred that when evaluating whether a condition was stated 
“unambiguously,” the relevant reference point is the state officer who 
decides whether to accept conditional federal funds.161 In other words, 
courts cannot incorporate congressional legislative history into its 
analysis of spending conditions.  
In 2009, the Sixth Circuit addressed a NCLB conditional spending 
issue in School District of Pontiac v. Secretary of the United States 
Department of Education.162 The plaintiff school districts and 
education associations claimed that the so-called unfunded mandates 
provision163 does not require them to comply with NCLB requirements 
when federal funds do not cover the costs of doing so.164 The Sixth 
 
156. 548 U.S. 291 (2006). 
157. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012). 
158. 548 U.S. at 294. 
159. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i) (2012).  
160. 548 U.S. at 304. 
161. Id. at 296. 
162. 584 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc).  
163. 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a) (2012) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed 
to authorize an officer or employee of the Federal Government to 
mandate, direct, or control a State, local educational agency, or school’s 
curriculum, program of instruction, or allocation of State or local 
resources, or mandate a State or any subdivision thereof to spend any 
funds or incur any costs not paid for under this chapter.”). 
164. 584 F.3d at 256.  
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Circuit found that the provision failed the Pennhurst requirement 
because “the only thing clear about § 7907(a) is that it is unclear.”165 
This decision and Murphy foreshadowed part of the Court’s ruling in 
NFIB by strengthening the “unambiguously stated” requirement of 
federal conditional spending. 
More on point for this Note, one recent federal court decision 
specifically contemplated the coercion argument with regard to federal 
education spending. The Fourth Circuit, in Virginia Department of 
Education v. Riley,166 focused on an IDEA provision that demands 
that states provide a “free appropriate public education” to all 
children with disabilities, including those suspended or expelled from 
school.167 Virginia, an IDEA-funds recipient, had in effect a policy of 
withholding free educational services from disabled students who had 
been expelled for behavior unrelated to their disabilities.168 The U.S. 
Department of Education threatened to withhold all of Virginia’s 
IDEA funding for two years—a total of $60 million—if it did not 
change the policy. Virginia refused.169  
Ultimately, the court decided narrowly that the provision’s 
language did not create a condition.170 But the court continued to 
comment that if the provision was a condition, then the withholding 
of Virginia’s entire $60 million annual IDEA grant would surpass the 
“relatively mild encouragement” permitted in Dole.171  Similarly to 
Chief Justice Roberts’s and the dissenting Justices’ NFIB opinions, 
the Riley court noted the large amount of funding at stake; however, 
it rejected a percentage-based argument that the IDEA funding 
amounted to only five percent of Virginia’s spending to educate 
children with disabilities.172 Instead, the court contrasted the absolute 
amount of funding at stake with the small number of students 
affected by the provision.173  
 
165. Id. at 277.  
166. 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per curiam). 
167. Id. at 561 (discussing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2012)) 
168. 106 F.3d at 560.  
169. Id.  
170. Id. at 568.  
171. Id. at 569.  
172. Id. at 569–70.  
173. Id. at 569 (“Here, in stark contrast [to Dole], the Federal Government 
has withheld from the Commonwealth 100% of an annual special 
education grant of $60 million because of the Commonwealth’s failure to 
provide private educational services to less than one-tenth of one 
percent (126) of the 128,000 handicapped students for whom the special 
education funds were earmarked.”).  
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The federal courts’ recent treatment of conditional education 
spending indicates that NFIB’s coercion reasoning is more than an 
aberration applicable to only the Medicaid program. Instead, NFIB 
conforms to federal courts’ increased skepticism of federal conditional 
spending in education cases. As shown by these cases and NFIB, the 
Supreme Court appears primed to strike down federal conditional 
spending for education as unconstitutionally coercive.  
IV. Application of Post-NFIB Conditional Spending 
Doctrine to Federal Education Funding Scheme 
Chief Justice Roberts’s NFIB opinion relied on two separate 
theories from Dole to find the Medicaid expansion unconstitutional: 
(1) the expansion imposes an unexpected condition on prior funding174 
and (2) the expansion involves so much money that states could not 
refuse the offer.175 Using the Supreme Court’s NFIB reasoning, this 
Part explains how the stage has been set for the Court to find that 
federal conditional spending for education violates the latter of these 
two theories: coercion. 
A. Coercion by the Numbers 
The NFIB Court displayed a willingness to find an exercise of 
conditional spending in violation of the coercion principle, but where 
exactly the coercion line is drawn lingers as an open question. The 
Court established that Congress crosses the line when a conditional 
funding grant exceeds a certain threshold. As noted by the dissenting 
Justices, federal aid for elementary and secondary education is the 
next largest federal funding item to states after Medicaid.176 Under 
NFIB, if any other conditional spending item crosses from 
encouragement into unconstitutional coercion, it is education 
spending. But NFIB introduces a few wrinkles into Dole’s coercion 
analysis. Chief Justice Roberts and the dissenting Justices’ analyses 
significantly overlap but diverge in a few relevant respects as well. 
Chief Justice Roberts focused on (1) how large of an item 
Medicaid is in the average state’s budget and (2) the proportion of 
Medicaid covered by federal funds.177 Combining those two items, 
Chief Justice Roberts derived the statistic that drove his analysis: the 
 
174. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606 (2012). 
175. Id. at 2605. 
176. Id. at 2663 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., 
dissenting). 
177. Id. at 2604 (majority opinion) (“Medicaid spending accounts for over 
20 percent of the average State’s total budget, with federal funds 
covering 50 to 83 percent of those costs.”).  
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percentage of funding at risk compared to a state’s total spending for 
all purposes.178 
The dissenting Justices’ adjoining opinion adds several 
quantitative considerations.179 It emphasized the absolute amount of 
Medicaid funding directed to the states by Congress.180 The opinion 
then mentioned how much of the nation’s Medicaid expenditures 
derive from federal funding.181 Lastly, it joins Chief Justice Roberts’s 
opinion in highlighting federal Medicaid grants as a percentage of a 
states’ total spending, cherry-picking figures from a few select states—
Arizona and South Dakota—to support its coercion finding.182 The 
state-specific focus contrasts with Chief Justice Roberts’s use of 
budget figures averaged across all fifty states. 
Nuances aside, both opinions primarily considered the funding at 
stake in proportion to states’ total expenditures.183 Chief Justice 
Roberts declared that “[t]he threatened loss of over 10 percent of a 
State’s overall budget . . . is economic dragooning.”184 Both opinions 
cited an annual report by the National Association of State Budget 
Officers (NASBO).185 Using data from other NASBO reports, the 
application of NFIB’s analysis to NCLB conditional funding generates 
 
178. Id. at 2604–05. 
179. Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and 
Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 
93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 62 (2013) (“These factors in their totality supported 
the plurality’s determination that states are effectively ‘locked in’ to 
Medicaid. But the conflation of financial and other considerations 
muddles the coercion analysis; the Court failed to indicate which of these 
factors is decisive for a law’s constitutional status.”) (citation omitted).  
180. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2662–63 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., 
dissenting) (“In 2010, the Federal Government directed more than 
$552 billion in federal funds to the States . . . Of this, more than 
$233 billion went to pre-expansion Medicaid.”) (citation omitted). 
181. Id. at 2663. In addressing states’ reliance on federal conditional spending 
for certain categorical purposes, the dissenting Justices treat elementary 
and secondary education as a distinct category of funding from higher 
education. See, e.g., id. (referring to elementary and secondary 
education as a single funding item). The Court rests this distinction on 
the fact that funding for these respective categories derives from 
different legislative schemes.  
182. Id. at 2663–64. 
183. Id. at 2663 (“But the sheer size of this federal spending program in 
relation to state expenditures means that a State would be very hard 
pressed to compensate for the loss of federal funds by cutting other 
spending or raising additional revenue.”); id. at 2604–06 (majority 
opinion).  
184. Id. at 2605. 
185. Nat’l Ass’n of State Budget Officers, 2010 State Expenditure 
Report: Examining Fiscal 2009–2011 State Spending (2011). 
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a figure below Chief Justice Roberts’s ten percent coercion mark. 
From 2002 to 2010, NCLB conditional funding to the states as a 
percentage of total state expenditures peaked in 2003 at 2.11%.186 
This percentage still greatly exceeds—by a multiple of eleven—
the 0.19% of state expenditures at stake in Dole.187 After 2003, the 
percentage of total state expenditures from NCLB conditional funding 
has gradually dipped, even though NCLB funding has increased. By 
2010, the $25.1 billion in NCLB funding to states equated to only 
1.55% of states’ total expenditures.188 These percentages do not rise to 
the levels at issue in NFIB, but the NFIB Court did not set a 
minimum threshold for coercion.189 NCLB’s conditional funding in 
relation to overall state expenditures places its coerciveness between 
Dole’s 0.19% and NFIB’s 10.0%. Thus, by applying NFIB’s budgetary 
analysis to NCLB’s federal conditional spending for education, an 
argument emerges: conditional spending for education as it exists 
under NCLB today is unconstitutionally coercive. 
Budgetary arguments beyond the Court’s focus in NFIB support 
this argument as well. While Chief Justice Roberts and the dissenting 
Justices measure reliance using total state expenditures as a base 
value, state gross domestic product (GDP) provides a better measure. 
Reliance hinges on a state’s ability to fund a program, not its 
willingness to fund it. If the state can fund a program to a certain 
level but declines to do so, it nonetheless maintains its ability to 
 
186. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, NCLB Funding 4 (2010) (2003 NCLB funding of 
$23.8 billion); Nat’l Assoc. of State Budget Officers, 2004 State 
Expenditure Report 6 tbl.1 (2005) (2003 total state expenditures of 
$1.13 trillion). 2003 NCLB funding comprised almost one-tenth of what 
states spent for elementary and secondary education, which totaled 
$245.6 billion. Id. at 16 tbl.7.  
187. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2664. 
188. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, supra note 186, at 3; Nat’l Assoc. of State 
Budget Officers, State Expenditure Report: Examining Fiscal 
2010–2012 State Spending 7 tbl.1 (2012), available at 
http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/State%20Expenditure%20Repo
rt_1.pdf (2010 total state expenditures of $1.62 trillion).  
189. But see Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius: 
The Example of Federal Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 622–25 
(2013) (arguing that the NCLB funding figures are insufficient to show 
coercion because they are closer to the figures in Dole rather than 
NFIB). Professor Pasachoff likewise discusses the post-NFIB treatment 
of NCLB. On the issue discussed in this Note—labeled the “economic 
dragooning” theory by Pasachoff—she relied on the 1.5% figure’s 
relative proximity to Dole’s 0.19% as the crucial indicator that mollifies 
coercion concerns. Id. This argument shortchanges the sizeable 
difference between those two figures. And because the Court did not 
specify when funding becomes coercive, any figure above 0.19% yields a 
plausible argument for coercion.  
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decline federal funding.190 States with lower total expenditures per 
capita may have the ability to tax and spend more on education, but 
they choose not to. As opposed to total spending, state GDP—a 
measure of a state’s total output—better indicates the size of a state’s 
tax base, and thus its ability to pay, because it does not incorporate a 
state’s overall inclination to tax and spend for all purposes.  
Using state GDP as a base value reveals states’ growing reliance 
on federal education funding, which in turn indicates states’ limited 
ability to choose whether to accept federal funding. Federal education 
funding as a percentage of state GDP has doubled since the time of 
Dole with the most dramatic increases occurring after NCLB 
implementation. From 1987 to 2011, the percentage rose from 0.22% 
to 0.47%.191 In 2001, the year of NCLB’s enactment, the percentage 
sat at just 0.26%.192 While these percentages may appear low, it is 
important to consider that the base value is the states’ total economic 
output in a year, not just government spending.  
As of 2001, only thirty-three states had seen an increase in federal 
education funding as a percentage of state GDP since 1987. But all 
states—with the exception of Maine—experienced an increase from 
 
190. The Fourth Circuit has raised the concern that comparing federal 
conditional funding to state budgets would create a perverse inventive 
for states to spend less in areas where they receive federal monies in an 
attempt to establish coercion. Va. Dep’t. of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 
559, 570 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per curiam). 
191. Karen A. Farrell, Nat’l Assoc. of State Budget Officers, 
1989 State Expenditure Report 28 (1989) (1987 federal education 
funds to states of $10.3 billion); Interactive Data, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (last visited Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_
regional.cfm (select “Begin using the data . . .” button; then “Gross 
domestic product by state”; then “Gross domestic product”; then “SIC”; 
then “All industry total”; then select United States as the area; then 
select 1987 as the year) (1987 combined state GDP of $4.6 trillion); 
Nat’l Assoc. of State Budget Officers, 2002 State 
Expenditure Report 16 tbl.7 (2011 federal education funds to states 
of $70.5 billion); Interactive Data, Bureau of Economic Analysis (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_regional.cfm 
(select “Begin using the data…” button; then “Gross domestic product 
by state”; then “Gross domestic product”; then “NAICS”; then “All 
industry total”; then select United States as the area; then select 2011 
as the year) (2011 combined state GDP of $14.9 trillion). 
192. Nat’l Assoc. of State Budget Officers, 2002 State Expenditure 
Report 16 tbl.7 (2003) (2001 federal education funds to states of 
$26.8 billion); Interactive Data, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_regional.
cfm (select “Begin using the data…” button; then follow “Gross domestic 
product” hyperlink in the first dropdown list; then choose “NAICS”; then 
select “All industry total”; then select each state individually; then select 
2001 as the year) (2001 combined state GDP of $10.22 trillion).  
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1987 to 2011.193 Perhaps the most impressive transformation happened 
in Montana, which received only 0.06% of its GDP in federal 
education funds in 1987 but brought in 0.66% in 2011.194 More than 
half the states during 1987–2011 doubled their federal education funds 
in relation to state GDP.  
While the NFIB court did not rely on GDP comparisons, it 
incorporated reliance into its coercion analysis. By accounting for 
states’ ability, as opposed to willingness, to tax and spend, these GDP 
comparisons more accurately show how states rely more on federal 
education spending after the implementation of NCLB’s conditional 
funding scheme. The greater reliance boosts the argument that 
current levels of conditional education spending deprive states of a 
real choice in accepting the federal funds.  
Moreover, district and circuit courts may opt to use GDP for the 
comparative analysis instead of state expenditures. For example, the 
Fourth Circuit, in Riley, raised the concern that comparing federal 
conditional funding to state budgets would create a perverse incentive 
for states to spend less in areas where they receive federal funds in an 
attempt to establish coercion.195 Using state GDP as the reference 
point for coercion mitigates this concern. But while the GDP 
comparison seems to reveal more about the expansion of federal 
conditional spending in education, the argumentative force behind 
this budgetary analysis is essentially the same regardless of the 
financial reference point. Ultimately, the numbers land between Dole 
and NFIB.  
B. Application of the Coercion Principle’s Rationales 
The budget figures alone make a compelling case for coercion. 
Even so, a reconsideration of Dole’s rationales with respect to 
conditional spending for education reinforces the budgetary arguments 
made in the prior section, thus placing added pressure on federal 
courts to find the spending unconstitutionally coercive.  
First, the confluence of increased federal control through 
conditional spending and the tradition of local and state control196 
complicates the electorate’s task of determining whom to hold 
responsible. Voters intuitively connect education policy to local and 
state decision makers. Even voters that acknowledge the federal 
government’s increased role in education must undertake the 
exhausting task of tracing federal funding to know who is responsible 
 
193. See supra note 191. 
194. See supra note 191. 
195. Riley, 106 F.3d at 570. Using state GDP as the reference point for 
coercion analysis absolves this concern.  
196. See discussion supra Part II.A–C. 
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for what. As a result, few voters have a firm grasp of the division of 
policy authority between federal, state, and local authorities. 
Adding to the confusion, substantial federal involvement in 
education policy adds not a second but a third layer into the 
equation. To properly assess whom to hold accountable in education 
and to what degree, a voter must understand the fluid involvement of 
school administrators, local school board members, state school board 
members, state legislators, governors, members of Congress, the U.S. 
Department of Education, and the President.197 The involvement of 
more decision makers additionally enables all of them to maintain 
plausible deniability. In other words, federal involvement creates more 
outlets for deflecting blame. Accordingly, both policy makers and 
policy implementers gain political insulation.198 And as the electorate’s 
ability to administer accountability diminishes, meaningful democratic 
participation in education dwindles. 
Second, the modern coercion principle aims to protect state 
choice. Behind Dole’s language distinguishing “encouragement” from 
“coercion” lies the fear of state reliance on federal money.199 When 
states build a reliance on federal money, they begrudgingly conform to 
federal policies. When that happens, funding deprives the states of 
any practical choice in turning down funds, which in turn enables the 
federal government to enlist the states in implementing its own 
policies. NFIB repeated these concerns.200 In discussing the 
requirement that states voluntarily accept the terms of federal 
spending, Chief Justice Roberts stated that “[r]especting this 
limitation is critical to ensuring that Spending Clause legislation does 
not undermine the status of the States as independent sovereigns in 
our federal system.”201 In addition, the dissenting Justices underscored 
the reliance concern when comparing federal Medicaid funding to 
total state expenditures.202  
197. Assuming a person votes for two state legislators, five local board of 
education members, and a single state board of education member, the 
voter must decipher the actions of ten policy makers and their political 
opponents. In addition, the voter must consider the influence of the 
state’s governor and the President. If voters regularly fail to shoulder 
this burden, then the people controlling education gain insulation from 
whom they serve. 
198. See Greve, supra note 7, at 593–94 (arguing that this lack of political 
accountability explains the general ineffectiveness of cooperative policies, 
which, despite their limitations, are increasing in use).  
199. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (stating its decision 
recognizes the potential danger of depriving states of realistic choice 
when accepting conditional funds). 
200. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602–03 (2012). 
201. Id. at 2602. 
202. Id. at 2663–64 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
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Fueling the concern for state reliance, conditional spending 
diminishes the alternatives available to a state. Citizens are subject to 
taxation from federal, state, and local governments. Given that a 
state’s tax base is limited, any tax imposed and collected by the 
federal government diminishes a state’s ability to collect taxes from 
that base.203 State legislators incur steeper political costs for taxing 
that base as well. Because heavy federal taxation diminishes a state’s 
ability to demand more money from its citizens, Congress deprives 
that state of its ability to choose whether to accept federal funding 
when it offers an overly large amount of money.204 This concern 
heightens in tight fiscal times. In metaphorical terms, by offering an 
especially large carrot, Congress effectively pulls everything else off 
the menu. Choice does not exist when there are no alternatives.  
The state-choice rationale for the coercion principle applies 
anytime states receive a large amount of conditional spending. As 
mentioned in Part IV.A, federal education spending granted to the 
states has grown as a share of state GDP since the time of Dole.  
A potential waiver of funding conditions, like those granted by 
the Obama administration for NCLB, does not mitigate these 
concerns.205 When accepting conditional funding, states do not know 
 
203. Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1911, 1935–39 (1995) (pointing out that since the adoption of 
the Sixteenth Amendment states can effectively tax its citizens’ income 
and property only after the federal government has taken its cut). 
Because of the federal government’s superior position, it gains the 
ability to offer states conditional funding that states could have 
otherwise obtained by directly taxing their citizens. So when Congress 
uses conditional spending, it effectively offers states a return of their 
own citizens’ money with the requirement that they follow certain 
conditions. Id.  
204. The dissenting Justices raised this point in NFIB. 132 S. Ct. at 2661–62 
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
205. See Charlton C. Copeland, Beyond Separation in Federalism 
Enforcement: Medicaid Expansion, Coercion, and the Norm of 
Engagement, 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 91, 161–65 (2012). Copeland 
acknowledges that the NFIB Court based its coercion analysis on the 
statutory framework at the time of enactment. However, he argues that 
doing so ignored the modern realities of bureaucratic cooperative 
governance. He asserts that the Court should have instead engaged in a 
more contextualized coercion analysis. While the Court has analogized 
much of its conditional spending jurisprudence to classical contract law, 
a consideration of relational contract principles to the relationship 
between the federal and state governments would have begged for the 
same type of contextualized analysis desired by Copeland. See James W. 
Fox Jr., Relational Contract Theory and Democratic Citizenship, 
54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 32 (2003) (“The relational emphasis of 
democratic citizenship makes it a natural counterpart to relational 
contract theory. In one sense, the political community is itself seen as a 
form of ongoing long-term contract.”). 
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whether a waiver will eventually be offered, when it will be offered, or 
to which conditions the waiver will apply. Because states do not know 
this information, they must operate on the premise that the federal 
government will enforce all the conditions of its spending. And while a 
waiver sounds like a clean escape from a condition, states may be 
required to comply with other conditions to receive the waiver.206   
Budgetary arguments and the rationales for the coercion principle 
combine to push federal conditional funding for education into 
susceptible territory. By finding the ACA’s Medicaid provisions 
unconstitutionally coercive, the Supreme Court has placed the 
constitutionality of federal education funding in serious doubt.  
C. The Future of Federal Education Funding: An Upward Trend 
As of April, 2013, the prospects for a serious coercion-based 
challenge to NCLB are minimal. With the reauthorization of ESEA 
pending before Congress, NCLB slowly approaches the end of its life 
cycle. ESEA reauthorization would undermine any successful 
challenge to NCLB. And as previously discussed, the coerciveness of 
NCLB conditional funding has diminished since its inception. But 
future conditional funding schemes for education—including the 
reauthorized version of ESEA—will need to comply with the Supreme 
Court’s post-NFIB coercion doctrine. Thus, the relevant focus shifts 
away from NCLB and to the potential conditional funding scheme of 
the pending ESEA reauthorization. 
Budgetary trends suggest that the reauthorized ESEA will grant 
an even greater amount of conditional funding in proportion to states’ 
total budgets, increasing its vulnerability to a coercion challenge post-
NFIB. Specifically, these trends reflect increased federal funding of 
education that is distributed through the states. Since the time of 
Dole, the proportion of state education expenditures financed by 
federal funding has increased markedly. Dramatic increases in federal 
education funding in absolute terms has fueled this financial shift. 
Federal funding for elementary and secondary education more than 
doubled between 1985 and 2010, rising from $32.9 billion to 
$88.8 billion.207 In addition to overall expenditures, federal education 
funding comprises a large portion of states’ elementary and secondary 
education spending. In the aggregate, twenty-one percent of states’ 
elementary and secondary education spending in 2010 came from 
federal funds.208 
 
206. See supra text accompanying notes 142–45 (noting that NCLB waivers 
apply to only select provisions and that future waivers will entail 
tougher requirements).  
207. Nat’l Center for Educ. Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Digest 
of Education Statistics 2011 543 tbl.D (2012). 
208. Nat’l Assoc. of State Budget Officers, supra note 188, at 16 
tbl.7. The proportion of federal funding within a budget category, such 
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V. Legislative Changes to Reconcile  
Federal Education Legislation with NFIB 
The coercion principle restrains Congress from overstepping its 
Spending Clause power to financially twist the arms of the states. 
Courts invoke the principle to preserve to the vertical segregation of 
duties envisioned under the Tenth Amendment. In seeking to preserve 
state control over certain policy areas, one should ask what rationales 
exist for maintaining state control. To further that line of questioning, 
this Part first discusses the justifications for preserving state and local 
control over education. In accordance with those justifications, this 
Part then offers recommendations for ESEA reauthorization to 
harmonize it with the coercion principle.   
A. Problems with Federal Involvement in Education 
Often the justifications for state control over an area derive from 
a tradition of state control. As discussed above, education represents 
a prime example of an area rooted in state control. Even in NFIB, the 
dissenting Justices used primary and secondary education for a 
hypothetical to illustrate how the coercion principle protects “areas 
traditionally governed primarily at the state or local level.”209 But 
other rationales supplement the case for state and local control over 
elementary and secondary education. The crux of these other 
rationales is that local and state entities are better suited to govern 
education.  
To begin, spreading authority over three levels of government—
local, state, and federal—fractures decision making. Federal 
involvement entails an added layer of information sharing and 
requires decision makers to notice and react to the actions of other 
authorities. Of the three levels of government, the federal government 
is the least apt for promulgating responsive education policies. The 
top-down approach inherent to federal regulation of elementary and 
 
as education, indicates reliance in situations where a state will struggle 
to replace lost federal funding within that category. For instance, states 
where constituents disfavor education compared to other public services 
will likely not replace lost federal education funding with additional 
state revenue. Because the state cannot replace the education funds, a 
higher proportion of federal education funding to state education 
expenditures serves as the best indicator of reliance. A state relying on 
federal money for forty percent or more of its education expenditures 
will abide by the conditions on that money if the state’s citizens will not 
support revenue increases specifically for education. But for states with 
a neutral or positive willingness to fund education, the proportion of 
federal education funding to total state expenditures serves as a better 
indicator of reliance. 
209. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2662 (2012) 
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
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secondary education creates the largest disconnect between the 
decision makers and the actual education environment.210 In 
implementing education policy, individual states and localities benefit 
from greater understanding of local conditions and a more 
homogeneous citizenry.211 Thus, more localized control enables the 
tailoring of education to a community’s individual needs. 
When the federal government imparts education policy, as 
opposed to state and local entities, the policy’s implementation will 
necessarily involve a wider range of actors.212 State and local 
implementers are subject to different political climates and confront 
different challenges than federal policy makers, which induces motley 
execution of the same policy.213 This effect subverts the idea that 
federal education policy achieves consistency. Any remaining hope of 
consistent reform implementation weakens further at the school 
level.214  
Broad, overarching federal education policies spurn the spectrum 
of different educational views and philosophies. Thanks to great 
thinkers like Noah Webster, Thomas Jefferson, and John Dewey, 
numerous theories about the relationship between education and 
democracy pervade modern education. The nature of this relationship 
defines the core objectives of public education, which in turn dictate 
the means for achieving those objectives.215 Given the fundamental 
differences between these conflicting educational philosophies, citizens 
should have the ability to meaningfully choose between them. But the 
electoral dilution of federal elections erodes the chance for citizens to 
 
210. Barolsky, supra note 79, at 741.  
211. Shannon K. McGovern, A New Model for States as Laboratories for 
Reform: How Federalism Informs Education Policy, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
1519, 1533 (2011).  
212. Superfine, supra note 150, at 93.  
213. See id. at 94–95.  
214. Jennifer A. Mueller & Katherine H. Hovde, Theme and Variation in the 
Enactment of Reform: Case Studies, in The Implementation Gap: 
Understanding Reform in High Schools 21, 21 (Jonathan A. 
Supovitz & Elliot H. Weinbaum eds., 2008) (observing significant policy 
implementation differences between fifteen high schools); see also 
Richard Weatherly & Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucrats and 
Institutional Innovation: Implementing Special-Education Reform, 
47 Harv. Educ. Rev. 171, 193 (1977) (reflecting on the importance of 
school level implementation of federal education law).  
215. Diane Ravitch, Education and Democracy, in Making Good Citizens: 
Education and Civil Society 15, 26–27 (Diane Ravitch & Joseph P. 
Viteritti eds., 2001). For example, Thomas Jefferson advocated for public 
education to enable people to protect their own individual freedom from 
tyranny. Id. at 16–17. In contrast, Noah Webster desired to use 
education to mold society and promote cultural cohesion. Id. at 16.  
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advocate for the type of education provided in their communities.216 
Thus, education decisions should be localized to minimize electoral 
dilution and give citizens the ability to democratically shape 
education policy. 
In addition, federal education policy stunts the benefits of local 
experimentation, commonly termed as using the “states as 
laboratories.” Over America’s educational history and still today, 
policy makers, teachers, administrators, and scholars have rarely 
uniformly supported the same policies.217 Current disagreements 
surrounding the wisdom of high-stakes assessments, merit-based pay, 
and school choice strengthen the case for allowing states to pursue 
their own policies.218 The alternative—imposing federal reforms—risks 
nationalizing and entrenching popular yet unproven reforms.219 
Moreover, implementing nationally homogeneous reforms hinders the 
development of a research base from which informed policy could be 
derived. 
Despite the benefits of concentrating control over education policy 
in local and state entities, an ideal allocation of authority still 
contemplates some federal involvement. By engaging in an oversight 
role, the federal government can advance national educational 
interests that escape state and local stakeholders.220 But for the 
reasons outlined in this section, federal influence should be minimal. 
 
216. A system of state, as opposed to local, control would entail similar 
electoral dilution but to a much lesser degree. Citizens stand a better 
chance of influencing education policy at the state level. This Note does 
not address the allocation of authority between state and local entities 
because it is beyond the scope of the U.S. Constitution. 
217. See Reese, supra note 85, at 336 (connecting Americans’ dissimilar 
education policy preferences to different views on the primary objectives 
of education); Liguori, supra note 131, at 1051–52 (reviewing divergent 
views about the wisdom of NCLB).  
218. Charles Clotfelter et al., High-Poverty Schools and the Distribution of 
Teachers and Principals, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 1345, 1378 (2007) (“More 
experimentation and evaluation . . . are clearly needed if good policies 
are to be developed . . . .”); see also Maris A. Vinovskis, Missed 
Opportunities: Why the Federal Response to A Nation at Risk was 
Inadequate, in A Nation Reformed? American Education 20 
Years After A Nation at Risk 115, 126, 130 (David T. Gordon ed., 
2003) (spotlighting the deficient research base available for deciding 
education policy).  
219. See McGovern, supra note 211, at 1541–42.  
220. See id. at 1542–46 (identifying global competitiveness and interstate 
resource inequality as examples of federal interests not addressed by 
state and local stakeholders).  
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B. Recommendations 
The current NCLB conditional funding scheme and the likely 
scheme of its successor raise serious coercion concerns. Assuming 
Congress continues to expand its role in education—as budgetary 
trends suggest it will—the utilization of conditional funding to 
achieve that expansion will receive heightened judicial scrutiny in 
light of NFIB.  
As mentioned by four of the Justices in NFIB—a case about 
health care—states retain the ultimate ability to choose education 
policies.221 Part V.A provides a few reasons for why this arrangement 
is ideal. However, modern conditional spending schemes for education 
threaten this arrangement. Therefore, to help restore the states’ 
ability to choose their education policies and to improve political 
accountability, Congress should consider taking the following steps to 
reconcile ESEA with the Supreme Court’s coercion jurisprudence. 
1. Extend More Funding Through Competitive Grant Programs 
The competitive funding model used in the Race to the Top 
program operates in accordance with the coercion principle in its 
current form. Because states choose whether to apply and what 
measures to enact to boost their applications, the competition model 
allows states greater ability to choose their education policies.222 By 
distributing more money through a renewed Race to the Top 
program, Congress can rely less on the traditional conditional scheme 
used by ESEA and its various reincarnations. Lowering the amount of 
conditional funding will in turn diminish the chances of a coercion 
ruling. 
Nonetheless, grant competitions still allow the federal government 
to influence education policy. For example, the Race to the Top 
formula awarded forty points for the adoption of common 
standards,223 which advanced the adoption of the Common Core State 
Standards by at least forty-six states.224 Thus, coercion issues would 
 
221. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2662 (2012) 
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).  
222. For a number of reform recommendations for the Race to the Top 
program, see McGovern, supra note 211, at 1550–54. McGovern explains 
that the initial program’s prioritization of specific education reforms 
compelled states to adopt the federally-endorsed reforms. Sharing my 
concern for federally driven education policy, she advocates that the 
federal government can serve a more proper role of innovation facilitator 
by instead assessing grant applications in an unbiased manner. This 
kind of financing can be especially beneficial on a national scale because 
of the informational externalities produced by local experimentation. 
223. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 137, at 7.  
224. See Michele McNeil, 46 States Agree to Common Academic Standards 
Effort, Educ. Wk., June 10, 2009, at 16 (reporting that all states have 
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arise if the amount of funding at stake through a program exceeds a 
certain level much higher than what Race to the Top currently 
awards. Money that citizens pay to fund the program is money that 
the states cannot collect to directly fund education. Yet courts would 
struggle to apply the coercion principle to a grant competition 
because of difficulties in determining the amount of funding at stake. 
2. Attach Tiered Conditions to Funding 
As opposed to typical all-or-nothing conditions, tiered conditions 
would receive more favorable treatment by the courts. Under NCLB, 
noncompliance with one provision may allow the Department of 
Education to pull all of an entity’s funding.225 States desiring to 
deviate from funding conditions must consider the harsh consequences 
of doing so. Thus, all-or-nothing conditions restrain state policy 
makers from deviating from those conditions even when compelling 
reasons exist for the deviation. 
Recall in Riley, the court mentioned that withholding Virginia’s 
entire $60 million annual IDEA grant because it did not comply with 
a funding condition that affected only a small percentage of students 
would have been unconstitutionally coercive.226 Tiered conditions may 
have solved this problem.  
Congress can avoid some coercion issues by simply unbundling the 
amount of funding at stake for each condition. As an alternative to 
all-or-nothing conditions, Congress may dictate the withholding of a 
certain amount of conditional funds for failure to comply with a 
specific condition. Reducing the financial punishment for not 
complying with a condition accordingly reduces the conditional 
spending’s coerciveness. Tiered conditions provide a middle ground 
between all-or-nothing conditions and a scheme in which only the 
funding related to a condition is at stake for that condition.227  
Conclusion 
In ruling the ACA’s Medicaid provisions unconstitutionally 
coercive in NFIB, the Supreme Court transformed the coercion 
principle from a mere rhetorical threat into a credible, federalism-
based restraint on Congress’s spending power. However, the decision 
stopped well short of precisely demarcating mere encouragement from 
 
agreed to common standards except for Alaska, Missouri, South 
Carolina, and Texas). 
225. See supra Part II.C.  
226. Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 569 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) 
(per curiam). 
227. By assigning different amounts for its funding conditions, the federal 
government can use tiered conditions to prioritize its provisions.  
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impermissible coercion. As Congress increasingly relies on conditional 
spending to accomplish its policy objectives, the importance of 
knowing what divides encouragement from coercion grows.  
Over a span of decades, Congress has steadily expanded its 
influence in elementary and secondary education through conditional 
spending. NCLB, the most recent authorization of ESEA, has offered 
states large amounts of conditional funding while demanding 
controversial reforms in return. Using NFIB’s approach to coercion, 
NCLB’s conditional funding falls in a middle ground below the 
funding at stake in NFIB but above the funding at stake in other 
coercion cases. Applying the rationales underlying the coercion 
principle to elementary and secondary education reinforces the 
argument for coercion.  
Therefore, if the reauthorized ESEA continues the trend of 
increased conditional spending for education, the legislation will be 
vulnerable to coercion challenges. To avoid these challenges, and to 
restore states’ control over education, Congress should increasingly 
employ two alternative devices for distributing education funding: 
competitive grant programs and tiered conditions. Without these or 
other changes, the reauthorized ESEA will likely prompt the Supreme 
Court to reaffirm its newfound commitment to the coercion principle.  
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